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THE TIME IS RIPE

U.S. Should Call Off Quarantine of Cuba.

STATINTL

BY CLAIBORNE PELL

In December, 1960, when tensions between Cuba and the United States were at a breaking point, I visited Cuba. A few weeks later, we closed our embassy there, making me the last member of Congress to have been in Cuba.

Upon my return, I talked with Allen Dulles, then director of the CIA, and his principal deputies and said that an effort by force

Sen. Pell, a Democrat, is Rhode Island's junior U.S. senator.

to stimulate an uprising or revolution simply would not work in Cuba because those who vigorously opposed Castro were either killed, in prison, or refugees. Those left in Cuba were, generally speaking, very supportive of Castro, I found. Most of the men carried arms which, in itself, would be unusual in a nation where the government was unpopular.

In fact, I believed that opposition to Fidel Castro had been effectively wiped out and that the great majority of Cubans was supporting their charismatic leader.

"Why didn't you tell me, too?" President Kennedy asked me after the disaster at the Bay of Pigs. Now I wish I had, even though a report from a newly elected junior senator might not have made much difference.

Having been present, so to speak, at the creation of more than a decade of chronic crisis with our Caribbean neighbor, I have followed Cuban developments with particular interest.

In the 1960 campaign, candidate Richard M. Nixon gave this prescription for getting rid of Fidel Castro:

"Now what can we do? We can do what we did with Guatemala. There was a Communist dictator that we inherited from the previous administration. We quarantined Mr. Arbenz. The result

was that the Guatemalan people themselves eventually rose up and they threw him out.

"We are quarantining Mr. Castro today. We are quarantining him diplomatically by bringing back our ambassador, economically by cutting off trade—and Sen. Kennedy's suggestion that the trade that we cut off is not significant is just 100% wrong. We are cutting off the significant items that the Cuban regime needs in order to survive. By cutting off trade, by cutting off diplomatic relations as we have, we will quarantine this regime so that the people of Cuba themselves will take care of Mr. Castro."

History has proved this prescription wrong.

After a decade of hemispheric economic embargo and diplomatic isolation, the Cuban people have not risen up to throw out Castro. Yet, to date, the White House has adamantly adhered to its quarantine policy.

Despite indications to the contrary, it has refused to admit that circumstances have changed sufficiently to require a new Cuban policy. Is this because the President refuses to admit that a prescription he gave 13 years ago has failed to work?

Foreign policies are hard to make, but often even harder to change, especially when presidential reluctance reinforces bureaucratic inertia. An alert, forceful Congress can be a catalyst in coping with this blockage. I believe the Cuban situation requires a congressional initiative.

It was for this reason that I recently introduced a bill (S.2082) to repeal the so-called Cuban Resolution of Oct. 3, 1962, which was passed shortly before our eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the Soviet Union in the missile crisis.

That resolution reflected the cold war policy of quarantine

and containment. In repealing this outdated, irrelevant piece of legislation, the Congress will be saying that it is time for change in the United States' Cuban policy.

The time seems ripe for such an initiative. Just last week Cuba's ambassador to Mexico said his government was "ready to discuss, not establish" relations with the United States if this country were prepared to lift its embargo of Cuba. The State Department was said to be studying the ambassador's statement and its implications.

Repeal of the Cuba Resolution by Congress could be the initial step in a new Cuba policy by the United States. What should this new policy be? Basically, I propose that the United States substitute negotiation and dialog for confrontation. This policy has been applied to China and the Soviet Union. Why not to our next-door neighbor, Cuba?

There are, however, special considerations that must be taken into account in making this change. It takes two to tango; it may be that Cuba will not respond to an invitation to the dance. To change the metaphor, a quarantine works both ways, and Castro may fear increased exposure of his people to the temptations of open societies.

The United States has worked through the Organization of American States (OAS) in establishing the *cordon sanitaire* around Cuba. The United States, therefore, must avoid unexpected, unilateral breaches of it—no dramatic summitry secretly arrived at.

The United States is the home of thousands of Cuban exiles from Castro oppression. They will fear the consequences of recognizing the Castro government as an

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Soviet Spy Thriller 'Exposes' U.S. Plot

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 6 — For most Americans, World War II has faded into history, left largely to scholars and retired generals to debate. But for Russians, it is kept vivid as a memory and a source of national unity through a flood of books, movies, memoirs, and lectures — but rarely as effectively as in the latest television espionage thriller, "Seventeen Instants in Spring."

The tale, which revolves around the exploits of a Soviet master spy planted high in the ranks of the German SS near the end of the war, is a shrewd combination of entertainment and political propaganda that serves to rekindle suspicions about the reliability of Western Allies, especially the Americans, despite the general aura of détente.

The Soviet spy, a handsome Russian émigré named Stirlitz, uncovers a plot by Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS, to negotiate a separate peace with the Western allies behind the backs of the Soviet Union through Allen Dulles, the chief of American intelligence in Bern.

The film is presented in fictionalized documentary form, with newsreel clips of fighting at the front and flashbacks to popular wartime tunes. It was so popular during its first showing in August that, although it is 14 hours long and is presented over 12 consecutive days, it was repeated again this winter by popular demand.

Not surprisingly, it is a frequent topic of conversation with foreigners, especially Americans. Quite a number of Russians take quite literally its suggestion that near the end of the war the Americans were untrustworthy allies, a suggestion that frequently crops up in memoirs and nonfiction histories of the war.

"It's not pretty, but that's the way it was," an army captain said recently to an American who shared his compartment in a train. "We have documentary proof of that. Of course, this movie was fictionalized, but we know what was done behind our backs."

"It's a good thing Stalin found out about it or it would have made trouble for us," an opera singer added.

Others, from taxi drivers to teenagers, expressed similar views though with varying degrees of sophistication about the actual course of events which, according to American documents, differed greatly from the film's version.

The idea of the attempted secret peace deal is but one of several bitter Soviet memories of the wartime alliance. Another sore point is the complaint that the Americans and British deliberately delayed opening the second front in Western Europe to let the Germans spend their force on the Russians.

Evidently out of desire not to offend the United States when dealings with President Nixon were just getting under way in mid-1972, "Seventeen Instants in Spring" was not immediately released when the filming finished that summer.

The work, by a successful and popular writer, Yulian Semenov, first appeared in the magazine Moskva in late 1969 and then in a book. Mr. Semenov also wrote the screen play.

For a Soviet film, it is unusual in several respects—the quality of its filming and its acting, especially the role of Stirlitz, played by Vyacheslav Tikhonov, an actor with an aristocratic face and bearing. Sometimes the action moves slowly but it has human touches and an air of suspense unusual to the Soviet screen.

Stalin appears as a wise and cunning strategist who divines the trickery of the allies and warns the chief of Soviet intelligence not to be outfoxed—a reversal of the bumbling role assigned him by writers and memoirs of the war during the Khrushchev period. Moreover, even

some of the high-level Nazis come across as believable men with complex motives especially in the final crumbling months of the Third Reich.

But for all realism, the movie strays far from the facts. The writers union weekly, Literaturnaya Gazeta, conceded that while "everything" in the film was "based on facts," the plot was an amalgam of events and some characters were composites drawn from real life but not strictly patterned on individuals.

No Such Spy

In particular, by other published accounts, the Soviet Union had no single spy in such a strategic and sensitive place as the top rank of the SS. More important, Mr. Semenov has shifted forward in time, actions that took place in March, 1945, and exaggerated their content and implications.

In his version, Himmler authorized Gen. Karl Wolff, the commander of SS troops in Italy, to begin negotiations with Allen Dulles in Switzerland aimed at a political settlement. Mr. Dulles and his agents are depicted as understanding that General Wolff is speaking for Himmler and they seek to arrange a post-war cabinet that would include Nazis and SS officers, hiding this from President Roosevelt. The implication is that only through Stirlitz did Stalin get confirmation of his worst suspicions.

Published American documents of that period assert that General Wolff made contact in Switzerland with Mr. Dulles and American and British generals on March 8 to discuss the surrender of SS troops in northern Italy and regular troops in Italy under the command of Field Marshall Albert Kesselring.

The American documents, published in 1963, show that the talks dealt only with a surrender of forces on the Italian front, not with a political settlement, and that Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov was immediately informed by Ambassador Averell Harriman. Mr. Molotov's response, according to Ambassador Harriman, was to approve the contacts, and to suggest that Soviet officers be included.

Stalin's Suspicions Aroused

Although the movie concludes its story on March 15, 1945, the American documents show that from mid-March to early April Washington and Moscow exchanged increasingly sharp notes and messages on the issues of a surrender on the Italian front, with Washington assuring that the Soviet Union could be represented and Moscow taking the view that something was being done to exclude it. Nothing in the documents—even known Soviet documents—suggested Himmler's involvement or any political negotiation.

But Stalin charged in a cable to President Roosevelt that the Allies had reached agreement with Marshal Kesselring on the Western front to permit British and American troops to advance to the east in return for an easing of peace terms.

In reply, President Roosevelt told Stalin he had received the charges "with astonishment." He repeated that no agreement had been reached, no full-fledged negotiations held.

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